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We are in the midst of a national conversation, albeit raucous and 
vitriolic, about questions of membership and belonging.  As Congress 
repeatedly fails to take action on comprehensive immigration reform, the 
Executive exercises its authority to determine which migrants should be 
eligible to remain, becoming incorporated into our polity, and which 
should be deported.1  Even if President Obama’s executive actions 
withstand the current legal challenges, many migrants will remain 
undocumented and vulnerable to exploitation and abuse.2  This 
vulnerability is rooted in their inability to call upon the basic protective 
functions of the state in which they reside for fear of deportation.  While 
undocumented migrants are not technically stateless, they exist in a legal 
limbo that recalls statelessness.  Their state of residence does not 
recognize their existence; they are for all intents and purposes beyond the 
reach of their state of nationality.  In a world that still grounds the 
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protection of basic rights in sovereignty, these sans-papiers have signed 
the wrong political contract. 
The solution offered by many advocates is to frame undocumented 
migrants’ rights as international human rights.  After all, this set of rights 
crosses sovereign borders; it offers a universal political contract available 
to every human being simply by dint of their humanity.  At least that’s 
the story that international human rights law tells about itself and that a 
superficial read might confirm.  A closer examination finds that human 
rights law fails to extend the rights that are most crucial in protecting 
undocumented migrants against vulnerability.3  In other words, 
undocumented migrants’ rights are most definitely not international 
human rights, and international human rights are not as universal as they 
claim. 
Critiques of the concept and framework of international human 
rights, if not common, are offered in several social science literatures.4  
Though even rarer in legal scholarship, which tends to reify international 
human rights law as offering solutions to all of the worlds’ problems, if 
we could just convince countries to implement it properly, several legal 
academics have put forward thoughtful critical perspectives on human 
rights law.5  Only a handful of scholars have explicitly extended this 
critique to the situation of undocumented migrants under international 
human rights law.6  Though these scholars are pushing the boundaries of 
contemporary legal thought, they share a common foremother who 
grappled with similar concerns more than a half century ago: Hannah 
Arendt.7 
This article aims to make explicit the intellectual debt owed to 
Arendt by analyzing the problems facing undocumented migrants today 
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through the lens of ideas she presents in The Origins of Totalitarianism.  
It begins by defining and describing three vulnerable populations: 
minorities, stateless, and undocumented.  The article then presents three 
central arguments from Arendt’s critique of human rights as applied to 
the minorities and the stateless.  It next discusses the striking parallels 
with the situation of the undocumented today and also explores the 
differences between the three groups.  The article concludes by drawing 
on those differences to suggest ways to better protect the undocumented 
from vulnerability in the absence of adequate protection under human 
rights law. 
II. ARENDT IN CONTEXT 
Hannah Arendt is best known for her work as a political theorist 
focused on questions of power and authority.8  One of the pre-eminent 
theorists on the problem of statelessness, Arendt herself was stateless for 
eighteen years.9  Born in Germany, she fled to France in 1933 after being 
imprisoned by the Gestapo.10  In 1940, Arendt was interned by the Vichy 
Regime.11  She escaped after a few weeks and fled to the United States in 
1941.12  Arendt finally obtained U.S. citizenship in 1951, after earning a 
deep personal understanding of the obstacles facing the stateless in 
exercising their rights.13 
Arendt’s critique of human rights must be understood within its 
historical context.14  The Origins of Totalitarianism was first published in 
1950, before modern international human rights treaties had been 
ratified.  Her concern was with the Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
concepts of human rights, rather than the specific international legal 
frameworks found within the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the other treaties that form the corpus of 
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 11.  See id. 
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international human rights law today.  Arendt’s critique is also, of 
course, focused on the situation of forced migrants in Europe after the 
First and Second World Wars.  Though there are many differences 
between her subject population and the situation of undocumented 
migrants seeking to enter developed countries in the modern era, her 
critiques of the concept of human rights are still trenchant when applied 
to the treatment of the undocumented under contemporary international 
human rights law. 
III. THE MINORITIES, THE STATELESS, AND THE UNDOCUMENTED 
Arendt focuses on two populations in her critique of human rights: 
the minorities and the stateless.  This article defines minorities as 
nationals of one country governed by nationals of another country,15 and 
stateless as those who are without a nationality, having lost their national 
state or having been denationalized.16  Arendt provides historical context 
for these definitions.  Her analysis begins with the Paris Peace 
Conference of 1919.17  The Peace Treaties that ended World War I 
redrew the map of Europe.  Austria-Hungary was dissolved and the 
Baltic States were established.18  This new state ordering created the 
minorities, as people who considered themselves nationals of different 
countries were now merged into one country.  Arendt explains that the 
Peace Treaties carved these new compatriots into three groups: one set 
was awarded the power to govern, a second group was incorrectly 
assumed to be equal partners in governance, and the remainder became 
“minorities.”19  In both of the postwar periods, a variety of factors 
contributed to the growth of statelessness.20  Some people became 
stateless for lack of proof of their country of origin, a problem that was 
exacerbated for those no longer resident in their city of birth. 
[S]ometimes their place of origin changed hands so many times in the 
turmoil of postwar disputes that the nationality of its inhabitants 
                                                          
 15.  See Helmer Rosting, Protection of Minorities by the League of Nations, 17 AM. J. INT’L L. 
641, 641 (1923) (noting that these national minorities might also be linguistic, racial, or religious 
minorities). 
 16.  See, e.g., Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons art. 1, ¶ 1, Sept. 28, 1954, 
360 U.N.T.S. 117 (defining “stateless person” as “a person who is not considered as a national by 
any State under the operation of its law”). 
 17.  HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 270 (1976). 
 18.  Miriam Rürup, Lives in Limbo: Statelessness After Two World Wars, 49 BULL. GERMAN 
HIST. INST. 113, 122 (2011). 
 19.  ARENDT, supra note 17, at 270. 
 20.  Rürup, supra note 18, at 118–21. 
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changed from year to year . . . ; more often than one would imagine, 
people took refuge in statelessness . . . in order to remain where they 
were and avoid being deported to a “homeland” where they would be 
strangers . . . .21 
At the same time, many refugees—Armenians, Germans, 
Hungarians, Russians, Spaniards—who had been forced out of their 
home countries by revolutions were denationalized by their 
governments.22 
This article compares the treatment of the minorities and the stateless 
under international law with the contemporary position of undocumented 
migrants vis-à-vis international human rights law.  It focuses on the 
situation of these three groups outside the state’s political boundaries, 
and the role of international law in ameliorating or exacerbating the 
vulnerabilities that arise from that location.  To that end, I define the 
undocumented as “individuals without any lawful immigration status or 
any special claim to protection against deportation.”23  These are 
individuals who have neither a visa nor a claim to asylum to fall back on.  
If they are caught by state authorities, they can be deported at any time.  
While it is important to remember that individuals move back and forth 
between different immigration statuses over time, this article explores the 
applicability of international human rights law to those who are, at that 
time, beyond the political boundaries of the state.  This includes 
individuals who might actually have some claim to remain but are 
unaware of that claim, but excludes those who have a lawful status that is 
in jeopardy because of their criminal convictions.  The former are not 
within the state’s political boundaries until they are made aware of their 
claim, and the latter remain within those boundaries until after the 
immigration process upon which my analysis focuses. 
Like the minorities and the stateless, undocumented migrants are 
vulnerable.24  Because they are unable, for financial and other reasons, to 
obtain lawful entry papers, the undocumented are forced to take risky 
journeys to their destination state.  Many migrants die en route, facing 
heat exhaustion and violent criminals in the desert south of the U.S. 
border or deadly exposure and capsized vessels on sea routes to Europe 
                                                          
 21.  ARENDT, supra note 17, at 277–78.  
 22.  Id. at 278; Rürup, supra note 18, at 118–19. 
 23.  Ramji-Nogales, supra note 3, at 714. 
 24.  See, e.g., Jorge A. Bustamante, Immigrants’ Vulnerability as Subjects of Human Rights, 36 
INT’L MIGRATION REV. 333, 340 (2002) (describing the threats faced by and precarious status of 
migrants around the world). 
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and Australia.25  If they are caught entering the country without 
authorization, these migrants are often detained in prison-like 
conditions.26  Those who avoid apprehension by border authorities face 
exploitation at the hands of employers, traffickers, members of their 
community, and law enforcement alike.27  Because they can be deported 
at any time, the undocumented have little recourse against such abuse 
and mistreatment.28  Moreover, most undocumented migrants who have 
resided in a host country for some time build up community and family 
ties.  They live with the constant fear that deportation will rip them away 
from the lives that they have built, including their spouses and children.29  
This article highlights these two central challenges of being 
undocumented: the lack of recourse against exploitation due to fear of 
deportation and the rupture of family and community ties through 
deportation. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW PROTECTIONS FOR 
UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANTS 
Though international human rights law presents itself as representing 
universal values, it does little to protect undocumented migrants against 
exploitation because of their migration status and rupture of family ties.  
In order to understand the limited scope of international human rights 
law’s protections, these concerns can be framed in the terminology of 
rights.  These are arguably the rights that undocumented migrants would 
prioritize if they were writing international human rights law; in other 
words, the existence or non-existence of these rights can be used to test 
whether human rights law’s underlying values are truly universal. 
Perhaps the most important for undocumented migrants is the right 
to territorial security.  This is a conservative framing of the interests of 
                                                          
 25.  See, e.g., INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, FATAL JOURNEYS: TRACKING LIVES LOST DURING 
MIGRATION 50, 91, 151–53, 181 (2014), http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/Fatal 
Journeys_CountingtheUncounted.pdf. 
 26.  See, e.g., Detention Profiles, GLOBAL DETENTION PROJECT, http://www.globaldetention 
project.org/publications/detention-profiles.html (last visited May 25, 2015). 
 27.  See, e.g., Rights on the Line: Human Rights Watch Work on Abuses Against Migrants in 
2010, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2010), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ 
wrd1210webwcover.pdf. 
 28.  See, e.g., Cultivating Fear: The Vulnerability of Immigrant Farmworkers in the US to 
Sexual Violence and Sexual Harassment, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 24 (2012), 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0512ForUpload_1.pdf. 
 29.  See, e.g., Forced Apart: Families Separated and Immigrants Harmed by United States 
Deportation Policy, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 4 (2007), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/| 
reports/us0707_web.pdf. 
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the undocumented, as it is not a claim to open borders.  Instead, this right 
would protect migrants who have lived in a host country long enough to 
develop deep social attachments, enabling them to remain by obtaining 
lawful immigration status.  This right need not even be absolute—it 
could contain limitations based on national security and public order, as 
those concerns may be viewed as impacting the human rights of residents 
of the country in question. 
Even defined narrowly, the right to territorial security is not 
supported in any international human rights treaty or any soft law 
produced by human rights treaty bodies.30  Indeed, these treaties and 
interpretive bodies have consistently stated that they do not extend the 
right to territorial security to undocumented migrants.  The United 
Nations (U.N.) Human Rights Committee, which is the body responsible 
for interpreting the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR),31 has made clear that the treaty “does not recognize the rights 
of aliens to . . . reside in the territory of a State party.”32 It turns out that 
the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families protects only certain 
rights for certain workers.  The treaty states in no uncertain terms that it 
does not offer any right to “regularization” for undocumented migrants 
or their families.33  From the perspective of the undocumented migrant, 
the absence of the right to territorial security is deeply problematic.  The 
right to remain is an essential precondition for the exercise of other rights 
because the threat of deportation is a fundamental cause of vulnerability. 
International human rights law fails to provide undocumented 
migrants not only with the right to remain but also to fair procedures in 
determining whether or not they are deportable.  Thus, even if 
international human rights law offered the undocumented a defense to 
removal, they would not have the right to have that claim adjudicated 
fairly.  The right to procedural due process in deportation proceedings 
might include protections such as timely notice of the basis for 
deportation, a meaningful opportunity to be heard, open access to 
evidence presented against the migrant and a chance to respond to such 
                                                          
 30.  See Tara J. Melish, From Paradox to Subsidiarity: The United States and Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 389, 404–05 (2009) (describing human rights treaty bodies). 
 31.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 28, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 32.  Human Rights Comm., General Comment 15, The Position of Aliens Under the Covenant, 
¶5, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 9 (Vol. I) (May 27, 2008) [hereinafter General Comment 15]. 
 33.  International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families art. 35, July 1, 2003, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Migrant Workers 
Convention]. 
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evidence, a neutral decision-maker, judicial review, and even 
government-funded legal representation and interpretation.  While the 
ICCPR awards non-citizens lawfully in the territory certain rights in 
removal proceedings, the same protections do not apply to the 
undocumented.34  The U.N. Human Rights Committee has interpreted the 
procedural due process clause in the ICCPR as inapplicable to 
undocumented migrants.35  The same is true for regional human rights 
law in the developed world; the European Convention on Human Rights 
awards procedural due process protections in immigration proceedings 
only to migrants lawfully present.36 
Though these provisions of human rights law denying the right to 
procedural due process in immigration proceedings is applicable in most 
migrant-receiving countries, there is some support for the existence of 
this right in softer forms of human rights law.  The Migrant Workers 
Convention provides the right to a written expulsion decision in a 
language the migrant understands and the right to contest the basis for 
expulsion.37  That treaty, however, carries little weight, given that it has 
not been ratified by the countries that host most undocumented 
migrants.38  The Drafting Committee of the U.N. International Law 
Commission has provisionally adopted draft articles that provide for the 
right to notice and a hearing as well as government-funded representation 
and interpretation for undocumented migrants present in the relevant 
state for at least six months.39  These articles are not yet binding, as they 
have yet to be submitted to the U.N. General Assembly for 
codification.40  Regional human rights law also offers a different view of 
                                                          
 34.  ICCPR, supra note 31, at art. 13. 
 35.  According to the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 15: 
[I]f the legality of an alien’s entry or stay is in dispute, any decision on this point leading 
to his expulsion or deportation ought to be taken in accordance with article 13. . . .  
An alien must be given full facilities for pursuing his remedy against expulsion so that 
this right will in all the circumstances of his case be an effective one. 
General Comment 15, supra note 32, at ¶ 6, 9, 10. 
 36.  Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Protocol No. 7, art. 1, Nov. 22, 1984, E.T.S. No. 117; Nolan v. Russia, No. 
21512/04, ¶ 48 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
91302. 
 37.  Migrant Workers Convention, supra note 33, at art. 22. 
 38.  MASSIMO FRIGO, INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS: A PRACTITIONERS’ GUIDE 43–44 (2014), http://icj.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/Universal-MigrationHRlaw-PG-no-6-Publications-PractitionersGuide-
2014-eng.pdf (noting that none of the most developed countries are parties to the Convention). 
 39.  Sean Murphy, The Expulsion of Aliens and Other Topics: The Sixty-Fourth Session of the 
International Law Commission, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 164, 164, 166–67 (2013). 
 40.  Id. at 168 (explaining that the International Law Commission, on which Professor Murphy 
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procedural due process rights in immigration proceedings.  The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights has interpreted the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man as requiring that “in the 
context of immigration proceedings that include the sanction of 
deportation, . . . heightened due process protections apply.”41  These 
opposing perspectives on human rights law protections relating to 
procedural due process do not offer much real-world protection to 
undocumented migrants given their limited applicability. 
Given the widespread mistreatment they face precisely because they 
lack lawful migration status, the right to non-discrimination based on 
immigration status is fundamental to ensuring a secure existence for 
undocumented migrants.  Again, international human rights law offers 
extremely limited protections against discrimination based on 
immigration status.  The ICCPR is often portrayed as a treaty focused on 
promoting the principle of equality through non-discrimination rights.42  
Yet the ICCPR fails to explicitly reference immigration status in its long 
lists of grounds for non-discrimination.43  The treaty’s drafters 
specifically excluded even nationality from these non-discrimination 
grounds, apparently so that they were not obligated to offer certain civic, 
political, and property rights to non-citizens.44  The ICCPR could have 
been subject to progressive development through the “other status” 
ground for non-discrimination, but the U.N. Human Rights Committee 
has not interpreted this broadly worded clause to include immigration 
status.45  Similarly, the non-discrimination clauses in the Migrant 
Workers Convention and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) do not explicitly enumerate 
                                                          
sits, intends to complete and adopt these articles in 2015). 
 41.  Smith v. United States, Case 12.562, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 81/10, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.139, doc. 21 ¶ 63 (2010); Organization of American States, American Declaration 
of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. XXVI, O.A.S. Res. XXX (1948). 
 42.  See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., General Comment 18: Non-discrimination, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 9 (Vol. I) (Nov. 10, 1989). 
 43.  ICCPR, supra note 31, at art. 2(1) (requiring States Parties to ensure all rights in the 
Convention without distinction based on “race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status”); id. at art. 26 (requiring equal 
protection of the law on the same grounds). 
 44.  Annotations on the Text of the Draft International Covenants on Human Rights, ch. VI, ¶ 
181, U.N. GAOR, 10th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/2929, at 61–62 (July 1, 1955); Rep. of the Third Comm., 
Draft International Covenants on Human Rights, ¶ 113, U.N. Doc. A/5000, at 33 (Dec. 5, 1961) 
(“[I]t was generally felt that . . . the denial of certain civic or political rights to aliens . . . [did not] 
constitute[] discrimination within the meaning of article 2[6].”). 
 45.  See, e.g., General Comment 15, supra note 32, at ¶ 6 (“[O]nce aliens are allowed to enter 
the territory of a State party they are entitled to the rights set out in the Covenant.”) (emphasis 
added). 
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immigration status as a protected ground.46  The International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD) goes one step further, explicitly allowing distinctions based on 
immigration status.47 
Some international human rights law enables discrimination on the 
basis of immigration status by cordoning off certain rights for those 
lawfully present.  Even the U.N. Migrant Workers Convention delineates 
certain rights, such as the rights to family unity and equality of treatment 
as to housing, education, and other social services, as inapplicable to the 
undocumented.48  Similarly, the International Labor Organization’s 
Convention Concerning Migration for Employment refuses to extend 
protection against employment-related discrimination and social security 
benefits to the undocumented.49  And the International Labor 
Organization’s Migrant Workers Convention does not protect the 
undocumented against discrimination in opportunity and treatment with 
respect to employment.50 
Though the text of international human rights treaties enables 
discrimination against undocumented migrants on certain grounds and 
fails to offer explicit protection on other grounds, treaty interpretive 
bodies have been more protective of the rights of the undocumented to be 
free from discrimination based on immigration status.  The Committee 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights has interpreted the ICESCR to 
apply to undocumented migrants.51  The Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination has interpreted the language of CERD 
permitting differential treatment based on immigration status to apply 
                                                          
 46.  Migrant Workers Convention, supra note 33, at art. 1(1); International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 2(2), Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (prohibiting 
“discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status”). 
 47.  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 
1(2), Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 196 (permitting “distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences 
made by a State Party to this Convention between citizens and non-citizens.”). 
 48.  Migrant Workers Convention, supra note 33, at art. 36–56. 
 49.  Int’l Labor Org., Convention Concerning Migration for Employment art. 6, July 1, 1949, 
C097.  The same is true of the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers article 
1(1), which does not cover any of the three rights on which this section focuses.  Council of Europe, 
European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers, Nov. 24, 1977, E.T.S. No. 093. 
 50.  See Int’l Labor Org., Convention Concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the 
Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers art. 9–10, June 24, 1975, 
C143. 
 51.  U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment 
No. 20: Non-discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/GC/20, at 9 (July 2, 2009). 
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only where proportional to the achievement of a legitimate aim.52  The 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights contests the U.N. Human Rights 
Committee’s approach even more sharply, interpreting both the 
American Convention on Human Rights and the ICCPR to prohibit 
discrimination against undocumented workers in the terms and 
conditions of work.53 
The right to family unity offers the most promise in protecting 
undocumented migrants against deportation.  International human rights 
law chooses a restrictive definition of family unity, focusing on the right 
to remain in a country so as not to be separated from one’s family rather 
than the right to enter a country in order to be reunified with one’s 
family.  Family is also defined relatively narrowly to include only 
spouses and minor children.54 
From this starting point, the U.N. Human Rights Committee has 
awarded procedural due process protections to undocumented migrants 
in two cases by grounding them in right to family life and the right of 
citizen children to protection as minors.55  Though the European Court of 
Human Rights has a large body of cases drawing on the right to family 
unity to strike down deportation orders, the majority of these cases 
involve lawfully present immigrants ordered deported based on criminal 
convictions.56  In the three cases the court has decided involving 
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undocumented migrants—i.e., those who were not lawfully present at the 
start of deportation proceedings—it did not find a violation of the right to 
family life.57  Though it has not directly addressed the right to family 
unity in a case involving undocumented migrants, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights has signaled a willingness to interpret the 
right to family unity to include the undocumented.58  All in all, 
international human rights law does not offer significant protections in 
the areas that arguably matter most to undocumented migrants.  Perhaps 
most importantly in drawing parallels with Arendt’s work, the right to 
territorial security is not available under any international or regional 
human rights treaty or treaty body interpretation. 
V. ARENDT’S CRITIQUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE MINORITIES AND THE 
STATELESS 
Arendt’s critique of human rights, issued prior to the existence of the 
international human rights treaties discussed above, focused on the 
Minority Treaties.  Both at and subsequent to the Paris Peace Conference 
in 1919, the League of Nations created a system of unilateral 
declarations, bilateral treaties, and multilateral treaties (essentially 
bilateral treaties with one nation and the Allied Powers) aimed at 
protecting minorities in Eastern Europe.59  The Minority Treaties have 
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been hailed as a precursor to international human rights law, lauded for 
protecting the rights of national minorities in Europe.60 
Arendt had a different view of the Minority Treaties.  In her view, 
national governments did not want to be responsible for protecting 
minority nationalities.61  Through the Minority Treaties, the League of 
Nations enabled this refusal.62  The minorities were not entitled to 
domestic protection, but instead only to international protection at the 
hands of the League of Nations, which was of course composed of 
representatives of states.63  The European powers who ran the League did 
not want to have their sovereignty restricted—in other words, they did 
not want to be forced to protect minority nationals—so they could not 
similarly restrict the sovereignty of new states.64 
This is the first of three critiques that offer parallels to the 
contemporary limitations of international human rights treaties with 
respect to the undocumented.  Arendt explains that, in the case of the 
Minority Treaties, decisions about which rights are protected and how 
are made by sovereigns, so these rights will be restricted by the interests 
of these sovereigns.  The central problem that arises is that certain crucial 
rights are completely excluded from international protections.  They are 
dismissed from the discourse as “not rights” or not even worth talking 
about.65  In Arendt’s words, 
some secondary rights, such as speaking one’s own language and 
staying in one’s own cultural and social milieu, . . . were halfheartedly 
protected by an outside body, but other more elementary rights, such as 
the right to residence and to work, were never touched.66 
Why does this happen?  Why do sovereign nations determine the 
scope of human rights, which ostensibly come from the people?  This 
gets us to the core of Arendt’s critique of human rights: sovereignty.  
Treaties, even international human rights treaties, are agreements 
between sovereign states; they will always reflect state interests.67  This 
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problem is exacerbated when it comes to migration.  As Arendt explains, 
“Sovereignty is nowhere more absolute than in matters of ‘emigration, 
naturalization, nationality, and expulsion.’”68  The European powers 
jealously guarded their control over two key tools: repatriation and 
naturalization.69  Fearing mass influxes of migrants, they wanted to retain 
the power to send these migrants back to where they came from and to 
prohibit mass applications for citizenship.  The parallels with the modern 
day are so apt as to hardly require spelling out.  In the contemporary 
world, developed nations want to retain the power to expel migrants and 
to limit the numbers of migrants who have a political voice.  This results 
in serious limitations on international human rights protections for the 
undocumented. 
Arendt draws a helpful distinction between sovereigns, noting that 
“[m]odern power conditions . . . make national sovereignty a mockery 
except for giant states.”70  Only certain sovereigns are able to make 
decisions about which rights are included in the pantheon of human 
rights and about how these rights will be enforced.  The less powerful 
sovereigns have a given set of rights and obligations thrust upon them, 
and play little role in determining the scope and applicability of human 
rights. 
Arendt brings a second critique to bear on the Minority Treaties: the 
situation of non-nationals, minorities, as exceptional.  Under the 
Minority Treaties, rights attached to nationality.  Only nationals could be 
citizens and enjoy the full protection of national legal institutions.71  
People of different nationalities needed protection under the League of 
Nations—an exceptional law separate and apart from domestic legal 
system.72  Arendt notes that this approach “left the system itself 
untouched.”73  The existence of a separate class of people enabled 
exclusion and mistreatment without challenging or tainting the domestic 
legal order.  This was a system of legalized exclusion and second-class 
citizenship, much as we see today with undocumented migrants. 
Arendt’s third critique relates to the Declaration of the Rights of Man 
as applied to the stateless.74  She labels the Declaration as a “turning 
point in history,” a shift from divine law as the source of rights to 
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political rights that were sourced in every human being.75  Human rights 
were to be used where individuals needed protection against state 
sovereignty and societal arbitrariness.  These were allegedly 
“inalienable” rights, sourced in humans who were the only sovereign in 
matters of law.76  Arendt notes, however, that this claim is founded on 
erroneous assumptions about emancipation: 
[I]t turned out that the moment human beings lacked their own 
government and had to fall back upon their minimum rights, no 
authority was left to protect them and no institution was willing to 
guarantee them.77 
In other words, people were never really emancipated; they were 
always reliant on state protection. 
The stateless revealed this reality in stark terms.  They had lost legal 
status in all countries.78  The stateless couldn’t turn to their home 
government or to their host government for protection.  Without state 
protection, the stateless were located “outside the pale of the law.”79  
Arendt describes this situation as problematic for both the stateless and 
for society. 
According to Arendt, “[t]he stateless person, without the right to 
residence and without the right to work, had of course constantly to 
transgress the law.”80  The stateless could be subject to imprisonment 
without having committed any crimes.  Even worse, from Arendt’s 
perspective, is that “the entire hierarchy of values which pertain in 
civilized countries was reversed in his case.”81  For the stateless, it was 
better to become a criminal because at least then she would be 
recognized as human before the law. 
Arendt also highlights the “damage suffered by the very structure of 
legal national institutions when a growing number of residents had to 
live outside the jurisdiction of these laws and without being protected by 
any other.”82  Governments responded to this predicament by placing it 
in the hands of the police.83  Thus arose the danger of “gradual 
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transformation into a police state”—the larger the stateless population as 
a percentage of the population as a whole, the greater the risk.84  Arendt 
links this growth of police power with the “disgracefully little resistance” 
met by the Nazis from local police forces in occupied countries.85 
Beyond the loss of legal status, the stateless lost their political 
community.86  As Arendt explains, “[t]he fundamental deprivation of 
human rights is manifested first and above all in the deprivation of a 
place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions 
effective.” 87  It was not the loss of specific rights that was so 
problematic, but the loss of a polity in which any of those rights are 
guaranteed.88  This was ostensibly the role of human rights—to establish 
a global polity that guaranteed rights to all humans by virtue of their 
simple humanity—but the situation of the stateless and minorities 
showed otherwise.  In Arendt’s words, “[t]he very phrase ‘human rights’ 
became for all concerned—victims, persecutors, and onlookers alike—
the evidence of hopeless idealism or fumbling feeble-minded 
hypocrisy.”89 
VI. SHARED AND DISTINCTIVE VULNERABILITIES: THE UNDOCUMENTED 
This section applies Arendt’s three critiques of human rights 
protections for the minorities and the stateless to international human 
rights law’s contemporary treatment of the undocumented.  Her insights 
present shared and distinctive vulnerabilities that suggest ways in which 
the undocumented might protect themselves against exploitation and 
abuse despite the failures of international human rights law. 
For both the treaties and policies governing the minorities, the 
stateless, and undocumented migrants today, Arendt’s critique that 
sovereigns decide which rights will be protected holds true.  Though 
international human rights law claims to represent universal values, the 
content of these allegedly “universal rights” exclude those that are most 
important to the undocumented.  Arendt offers an obvious explanation 
for this contradiction: these treaties are drafted by representatives of 
states and must be ratified by state institutions.  In other words, 
sovereignty interests are deeply embedded in these treaties. 
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To be clear, this article does not claim that having sovereignty 
interests in treaties is a problem per se—the problem arises when a treaty 
claims to protect all rights but doesn’t do so adequately.  We see here the 
masking of state interests behind the costume of rights protection.  This 
is problematic because international human rights law’s universal frame 
disguises political choices.  These choices—determining which norms 
are used to establish what set of rights for which group of people—are 
deeply rooted in politics and culture.90  International human rights law’s 
claims to universality obscure these political choices and entrench them 
in a milieu beyond politics.91  In other words, these political decisions, 
now framed as universal rights, can no longer be questioned as political, 
as they are said to represent the values of all of humanity. 
Arendt’s second critique, of the situation of non-nationals as 
exceptional, is also an apt description of the contemporary status of 
undocumented migrants.  The undocumented are exceptional even from 
international human rights law.  As Arendt notes, this approach leaves 
the system untouched.  If the undocumented are exceptional, it is 
possible to pretend that we have a robust and even universal system of 
human rights—it’s just that those people, the undocumented, aren’t 
included.  This situation is problematic because it erases certain 
perspectives from the discourse.92  In contrast to the story it tells about 
itself, international human rights law doesn’t protect every human being, 
but instead creates hierarchy of suffering in which those outside its scope 
are dismissed from the discourse.  Again, this not an inherent problem; it 
becomes problematic because international human rights law frames 
itself as universal.  International human rights law claims that the rights 
it offers are inherent in all of humanity—but this story turns out to be 
true for only some of humanity. 
Finally, Arendt’s insight that human rights protections for the 
stateless and the minorities depended on state enforcement is equally apt 
with respect to the undocumented today.  Undocumented migrants have 
no political voice, and are largely excluded from legal protections in their 
host states.  International human rights law assumes emancipation where 
there is none; it ignores global economic disparities that prevent both the 
undocumented and their home states from protecting them.93  This point 
of course highlights an important distinction between the undocumented 
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and the minorities and the stateless—though the undocumented come 
from states that have little power on the world stage, they have not 
completely lost their ties to their own nation. 
VII.  FILLING THE STATE PROTECTION GAP 
In a world in which sovereigns alone wield the ability to enforce 
human rights, the undocumented, like the minorities and the stateless, are 
vulnerable because they face a gap in state protection.  Arendt’s 
reflections on the situation of the minorities and the stateless offer some 
suggestions as to how the undocumented might overcome this lacuna. 
Prior to World War II, the minorities provided one successful 
example of how to potentially overcome the problem at the heart of 
Arendt’s first critique—that human rights treaties depend on sovereign 
states for enforcement and that sovereigns are particularly jealous of their 
powers in the immigration context.  When establishing the Minority 
Treaties, the League of Nations and the Allies created separate treaties 
with each country as if the minorities did not extend beyond the borders 
of the respective states.94  None of these treaties were true multilateral 
treaties in the vein of contemporary international human rights treaties, 
which include numerous states as parties. 
In response to this shortcoming, the minorities created the “Congress 
of Organized National Groups in European States.”95  Rejecting the label 
“minorities,” they called themselves “nationalities” instead.96  This group 
extended their power beyond territorial borders so they could make their 
weight felt throughout Eastern and Southern Europe.97  Unfortunately, 
because the group was composed primarily of Germans and Jews, it 
disintegrated in 1933 when the Jewish delegation sought its participation 
in protesting the Third Reich’s mistreatment of Jews.98  Despite its 
untimely demise, this group offers an important lesson about the 
potential power of cross-border groups in challenging sovereignty and 
recreating political community. 
Today, we might call the Congress a “counter-hegemonic 
transnational network,” or a social movement.99  This approach offers a 
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group-based conceptual framework for resolving vulnerability, enabling 
mobilization outside of state institutions.100  Social networks “resignify[] 
what counts as political and who gets to define what’s political . . . .”101  
By using such an approach, undocumented migrants could openly 
challenge the political determinations that define the scope of 
international human rights law.  They could also challenge the depiction 
of the undocumented as exceptional.  Using social networks and protests, 
the undocumented could build networks, exchange information, and 
publicize issues important to them.102  In other words, through this 
approach, undocumented migrants could emancipate themselves, 
creating their own forum in which to express their political voice. 
There are, of course, shortcomings to a social movements approach 
to protecting the undocumented.  As the Congress example illustrates 
vividly, social movements are difficult to coordinate, given the variety of 
actors and interest involved.  These groups have few financial resources, 
and far less power than law or states.103 
While the social networks solution draws on the similarities between 
the undocumented and the stateless, it’s also important to remember that 
one big difference between undocumented migrants and the stateless is 
that the former still have a nationality, and their state of nationality 
should care about them given that they send home large amounts of 
remittances that contribute substantially to the economy in the home 
state.  This suggests a state-based approach in which governments of 
migrant sending states demand better treatment of nationals abroad.  
Rather than the undocumented publicizing the problems that they face, 
their home states could discuss these harms and expand conceptions of 
rights, contesting the depiction of the undocumented as exceptional.  We 
see this happening to some extent with the inter-American human rights 
system’s contestation of international treaty bodies’ interpretations of 
international human rights law. 
This state-based approach might take the form of a bilateral process 
between undocumented migrants’ home states and host states.  The 
migrant-sending states could highlight the economic benefits to migrant-
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receiving states from the migrants’ labor in demanding better 
treatment.104 
A media strategy could be used to bring these issues onto the global 
political stage, removing them from the insulation of international human 
rights law.  Migrant-sending states might even bring lawsuits before 
international legal bodies such as the UN Human Rights Committee or 
the International Court of Justice to challenge the treatment of their 
nationals abroad.105  Beyond these more assertive acts, migrants’ home 
states could engage in diplomatic protection activities, setting up 
structures both at home and abroad to assist their nationals.106 
These strategies, too, have their shortcomings.  For developing 
nations, these approaches are not only expensive but also risk political 
and economic backlash from powerful states. That brings up another 
point from Arendt’s critique: that sovereignty is real only for powerful 
nations.  Reliance on a state-based protection approach means that 
citizens of less powerful states won’t be protected.  Moreover, political 
elites in migrant-sending states may not be willing to represent 
undocumented migrants, who likely come from less privileged 
backgrounds than those making political decisions in their home states. 
These problems suggest a third option, which is a multilateral 
process or coalition.107  A group of migrant-sending states might create a 
permanent institution to contextualize the situation of undocumented 
migrants and advocate for equal treatment.  International and regional 
mechanisms already exist to coordinate state approaches to migration.  
This approach would differ from current efforts in that it would aim to 
radically restructure discussion around the undocumented.  Though a 
multilateral approach addresses some of the limitations of a bilateral 
approach, it still has its shortcomings.  Many powerful migrant-sending 
states are also migrant-receiving states, which may limit their willingness 
to protect non-citizens.  Moreover, though a multilateral process would 
give rise to less political backlash, or be more able to respond to such 
backlash, it would still be on the receiving end of negative responses 
from powerful migrant-receiving states.  As a result, and because its 
members would have differing priorities and interests, a multilateral 
state-based approach would face coordination problems. 
Arendt’s writings offer a wealth of insights pertinent to the 
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contemporary problems faced by undocumented migrants.  This article 
has explored just three of her critiques, finding similarities and 
differences between the treatment of the minorities and the stateless 
under international law in her day and the situation of undocumented 
migrations under international human rights law today. 
 
